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Abstract 
Wolterstorff’s critique of the reformational view of scholarship 
in his essay On Christian learning 
In this article I analyse Wolterstorff ’s criticism of aspects of the 
reformational approach to science and scholarship as 
expressed in his essay “On Christian learning” (Wolterstorff, 
1989). I argue that those allegations by Wolterstorff are not 
always well-founded, fully justified or supported by rigorous 
arguments. In particular, I examine Wolterstorff ’s complaints 
concerning the “connection between religion and scholarship”, 
religious “totalism”, expressivism and the issue of a “uni-
directional” view of science and religion. The purpose of this 
article is to remove obstacles that would hamper dialogue and 
cooperation between scholars in the traditions of reformational 
philosophy (Dooyeweerd et al.) and reformed epistemology 
(Wolterstorff et al.). 
Opsomming 
Wolterstorff se kritiek op die reformatoriese siening van 
wetenskap in sy opstel On Christian learning 
Ek analiseer Wolterstorff se kritiek op aspekte van die reforma-
toriese benadering tot wetenskap soos uiteengesit in sy opstel 
“On Christian Learning” (Wolterstorff, 1989). Ek argumenteer 
dat Wolterstorff se bewerings nie altyd goed begrond is, ten 
volle geregverdig is, of deur stewige argumente ondersteun 
word nie. Meer spesifiek: ek ondersoek Wolterstorff se besware 
teen die “konneksie tussen religie en wetenskap”, religieuse 
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“totalisme”, ekspressiwisme en die probleem rondom ’n eenrig-
tingsiening van wetenskap en religie. Die doel van hierdie ar-
tikel is om die struikelblokke in die pad van dialoog en same-
werking tussen wetenskaplikes in die tradisies van reformato-
riese filosofie (Dooyeweerd et al.) en reformatoriese episte-
mologie (Wolterstorff et al.) te verwyder. 
1. Introduction 
Nicholas Wolterstorff1 developed his philosophy within the reformed 
tradition. During his long career, he entertained a complex set of 
relationships with several reformed circles. One of his sources of 
inspiration came from Scotland, from Thomas Reid and the school 
of commonsense realism. In South Africa, he had close ties with 
Allan Boesak, but he also worked in close dialogue with reforma-
tional circles following the tradition of Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, 
Hart, et cetera.  
Twenty years ago Wolterstorff’s essay On Christian learning (1989) 
was published. In that essay Wolterstorff expresses some critique of 
and reservations towards the neo-Calvinist approach to scholarship 
and suggests a few alternatives on some specific issues. Without 
excluding other sources, this article focuses especially on the criti-
cism contained in that essay. In fact, in no other essay one finds a 
deeper and more explicit critique, by Wolterstorff, of the neo-
Calvinist view of scientia.  
By reading On Christian learning, one may sometimes wonder to 
whom precisely Wolterstorff’s criticism is directed. Which authors 
and which schools of thought does he have in mind when he refers 
to the neo-Calvinist and reformational movements? Fortunately, a 
footnote (n. 1 on p. 64 added to the 2004 republication of the text2) 
clarifies the issue considerably. Wolterstorff uses the term neo-
                                      
1 Born in 1932 (Minnesota), Nicholas Wolterstorff has been professor of 
philosophy at Calvin College from 1959 to 1989, then Noah Porter Professor of 
philosophical theology at Yale University (1989-2001). As a prolific writer (a list 
of his publications is available, e.g. in Sloane, 2003:255-257), he has been 
president of the American Philosophical Association and of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers. He has often collaborated with Alvin Plantinga. 
2 This text appears in Wolterstorff (2004:64-86) with the title The point of 
connection between faith and learning. When I quote the original (1989) text, 
references to the republication are also provided. 
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Calvinist3 as a synonym of “Kuyperian”, thus indicating all schools of 
thought (not only the reformational one) recognising Kuyper as a 
“father”. Then he uses “reformational” to refer to the specific 
“branch” of neo-Calvinism deriving from Dooyeweerd and Vollen-
hoven. These are the recipients of his criticism. In this article I adapt 
to Wolterstorff’s use of these terms, trusting this will result in a 
clearer exposition.  
In the title, I refer to Wolterstorff’s criticism of the reformational 
approach. Admittedly, in his essay Wolterstorff does not only/always 
address his criticism directly to Dooyeweerd or to the “reformational 
branch of neo-Calvinism” (Wolterstorff, 1989:64, 65, 66; 2004:71, 
72, 73). In some cases his critique concern “neo-Calvinism” in gene-
ral and in one case the even broader category of “the Calvinist” 
(1989:65; 2004:72). However, as the reformational school is both a 
Calvinist and a neo-Calvinist school and as it is never exempted 
from those critique, in the following pages I assume that all critique 
expressed in that essay concern the reformational movement as 
well.  
The scope of this article is limited to a discussion of Wolterstorff’s 
allegations in relation to the reformational “branch” of neo-Calvinism 
(not to other neo-Calvinist or Kuyperian circles). The fundamental 
question will be to know to what extent Wolterstorff’s criticism is 
fairly applied to the reformational school (or scholars). 
A considerable section at the beginning of On Christian learning is 
dedicated to a critique of Kuyper’s view of scholarship. If I under-
stand Wolterstorff’s approach correctly, however, Kuyper is not 
included in the reformational movement, as the trunk of a tree is not 
considered part of any one of the branches. This is the main reason 
why I will not examine Wolterstorff’s allegations against the Dutch 
theologian and statesman.4  
                                      
3 About his attitude towards the neo-Calvinist movement Wolterstorff (1989:68; 
2004:76) writes: “I myself was reared intellectually within this movement”. The 
criticism contained in On Christian learning shows that, at least for a period, he 
partially distanced himself from that tradition. However, Wolterstorff also clarifies 
that he agrees on several important tenets of neo-Calvinist thinking. For 
example, he maintains “the denial of the neutrality and autonomy of scholarship 
with respect to religion is something I embraced early on and which I continue to 
embrace” (Wolterstorff, 1989:68; 2004:76). 
4 A second reason is that alternative assessments of Kuyper’s views on 
scholarship are already available, for example Ratzsch (1987) and Strauss 
(1999). Finally, Wolterstorff himself has expressed more appreciative evalu-
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Although I certainly appreciate several aspects of Wolterstorff’s phi-
losophy of scholarship and many other aspects of his view of edu-
cation, society and art, in the following pages I am going to express 
some reservations towards some of Wolterstorff’s critique to the 
reformational movement. I will argue that often such critique is not 
fully justified, or supported by rigorous arguments. It is also fair to 
state beforehand that my own reflections and comments are deli-
vered from a reformational point of view. 
The main purpose of this article is to promote renewed reciprocal 
recognition between scholars in the two traditions. I am encouraged 
in this task by noticing that Wolterstorff himself, in recent writings, 
has toned down, reconsidered or at least rephrased several aspects 
of his criticism of the neo-Calvinist view of Wissenschaft.5  
There is one final methodological issue which I would like to point 
out. In his criticism, Wolterstorff focuses only on the “first and se-
cond generations” of the schools he criticises. Sometimes he cre-
ates the impression (at least in this author) that whatever vitium 
originis initially had affected these circles, it was automatically trans-
mitted to the next generations. Although the reformational move-
ment, for example, has produced a third and a fourth generation of 
thinkers (Van der Walt, 2007:222-223) Wolterstorff does not mention 
anyone of them. The implication seems to be that not much has 
changed since Kuyper and Dooyeweerd. 
In the following pages I will try to adjust the chronological barycentre 
of the discussion by including at least some reformational authors 
whose publications were available at the time when Wolterstorff’s 
criticism was delivered. My intention, however, is to a certain extent 
limited by the necessity of responding first of all to Wolterstorff’s 
allegations concerning the older authors explicitly mentioned in his 
essay. This will be the case already in the next section, in which the 
                                                                                                             
ations of Kuyper’s understanding of scholarship in other essays (cf. Wolterstorff, 
2004:117, 199-225). 
5 The present contribution remains helpful, however, because these re-
considerations (which I often acknowledge by quoting them below) often consist 
of paragraphs scattered in many articles and written at different stages. As they 
have not yet been properly articulated and collected in a coherent text, often the 
impact of the criticism contained in On Christian learning is still very much 
present in the minds of scholars in both traditions. Sloane (2003:111-126) gives 
that criticism a prominent position in his commentary on Wolterstorff ’s philo-
sophy. 
 R. Coletto 
Koers 74(3) 2009:387-407  391 
connection between religion and scholarship is the main topic and 
Dooyeweerd is the main author discussed by Wolterstorff. 
2. The connection  between religion and scholarship 
2.1 Two wrong approaches in the reformational tradition 
Wolterstorff says he was “reared intellectually” within neo-Calvinism 
(Wolterstorff, 1989:68; 2004:76). What made him more reluctant to-
wards it, at a certain stage in his career? This has everything to do 
with the connection between Christianity (i.e. religion) and scholar-
ship. 
I have come to feel acutely that the first- and second-generation 
founders of the movement did not succeed in pinpointing the 
connection between religion and the practice and results of 
scholarship. (Wolterstorff, 1989:68; 2004:76.) 
In his view, the neo-Calvinist attempts at linking religion6 and scho-
larship can be classified under two main chapters. “Some have 
argued that the link between religion and scientific inquiry lies in 
worldviews”, says Wolterstorff (1989:66; 2004:73). “The second at-
tempt (...) takes the concepts of faith and idolatry to be central in-
stead of worldview” (Wolterstorff, 1989:67; 2004:75).  
Wolterstorff classifies Dooyeweerd’s philosophy as belonging to the 
first “chapter”. In his opinion, “Herman Dooyeweerd’s explication and 
use of the concept of ground-motive is best placed within the context 
of the worldview approach” (Wolterstorff, 1989:67; 2004:75).7     
                                      
6 The adjective religious, related to scholarship may create some perplexity in a 
reader who is not acquainted with neo-Calvinist terminology. In Wolterstorff (and 
in reformational philosophy as well) it does not refer only to the “classical” 
religions (Christianity, Islam, etc.). It also refers to all types of ultimate 
commitments (e.g. of humanists, atheists, positivists, Marxists and whoever 
“interprets” life in some way or the other). From this point of view, therefore, all 
human beings are religious and hold religious commitments, beliefs, et cetera. 
According to Clouser (1991:22-23) “a belief is religious provided that (1) it is a 
belief in something(s) or other as divine or (2) a belief concerning how humans 
come to stand in proper relation to the divine”. Divine, according to Clouser 
(1991:22-23), should be defined as “... having the status of not depending on 
anything else”.  
7 In this quotation Wolterstorff seems not to see a big difference between 
worldviews and ground motives. It should be pointed out, however, that they 
differ in important ways and play different roles in scholarship. For a distinction 
between worldviews and religious ground motives see, for example Dooye-
weerd (1984, 1:68-168). Klapwijk (1989) and Wolters (1989) discuss the re-
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Contrary to Wolterstorff, Klapwijk (1987:108-109) however, explains 
that his own idea of legitimating a “mediating role of worldviews” is a 
rather recent proposal within reformational philosophy. One may add 
that it has attracted considerable criticism as well (cf. Geertsema, 
1987; Groenewoud, 1987). Wolters (1989:22 ff.) too maintains that 
such a view is not common among reformational scholars. Indeed, it 
cannot be regarded as an established pattern of thought within this 
philosophical school. 
As a matter of fact, Dooyeweerd (1984, 1:114-164) did not want to 
insert any worldview between religion and scholarship, the reason 
being that in his opinion this move would relativise and historicise 
Christian scholarship. So whose approach is Wolterstorff describ-
ing? In this case, unfortunately, he does not support his argument 
with precise references. After saying that “some have argued” for 
this solution, he (Wolterstorff, 1989:66; 2004:73) just mentions his 
“former teacher, William Harry Jellema”. 
Complicating the issue, he places Dooyeweerd in the second group 
as well, among those who use the concepts of faith and idolatry as 
the link between religion and science. Concerning this second 
group, once again, one wonders which reformational philosopher 
ever proposed faith (or misdirected faith) as a link between religion 
and scholarship. One might perhaps say that Dooyeweerd proposed 
the idea that a religious ground motive (but not faith)8 is the link 
between Scripture and scholarship. For the rest, I cannot recall any 
other example and Wolterstorff does not provide any references. 
As far as reformational philosophy is concerned, the idea of a con-
nection between religion and scholarship was proposed quite 
rarely.9 One might rather say that religion and scholarship were 
regarded as always/already connected. Concerning Christian scho-
larship the discussion focused rather on the connection between 
                                                                                                             
spective roles of these two frameworks in philosophy and the type of influence 
they exert. 
8 The distinction between faith and religion is crucial in reformational thought. 
While faith is an aspect of experience, religion encompasses all the aspects of 
experience. By distinguishing between faith and religion (e.g. Dooyeweerd, 
1984, 2:303) one is allowed to retain the particular “religiosity” of faith without 
limiting religion to faith.  
9 I can only recall Klapwijk’s above-mentioned proposal on the mediating role of 
worldviews and Van der Walt’s (e.g. 1994:572) model, which is, however, open 
to different interpretations.  
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Scripture and scholarship. In fact, religion itself was considered the 
link between Scripture and scholarship. For example, in Dooye-
weerd’s model, a religious ground motive (i.e. religion) constitutes 
the connection, and the two terms to be linked are Scripture and 
scholarship. In Vollenhoven’s model for scholarship even the me-
diating role of ground motives or other “bridges” is not considered 
that necessary or even helpful (cf. Klapwijk, 1987:106-108). Neither 
Dooyeweerd nor Vollenhoven, therefore, saw any need to link 
“religion and scholarship” as Wolterstorff argues. The idea was 
probably suggested to Wolterstorff by his own wish to propose a 
further connection between religion and scholarship, which is 
constituted by control beliefs (Wolterstorff, 1976:63 ff.). 
2.2 The issue of reductionism 
According to Wolterstorff (1989:69), for those who follow this faith-
idolatry approach (the second group mentioned above) “idolatry 
manifests itself in the academic disciplines in (futile) reductionist 
attempts to treat some dimensions of created reality as the clue to 
the whole” (Wolterstorff, 1989:68; 2004:75). The problem is, says 
Wolterstorff, that it is not possible to show that “whenever scholars 
fail to take God as absolute, their scholarship will display the tell-tale 
structure of being illicitly reductionist”. In his opinion there are, on 
the contrary, many examples of non-reductionist science outside 
Christian circles. “Neither Dooyeweerd, who especially embraced 
and elaborated this approach, nor anyone else has ever succeeded 
in showing otherwise” (Wolterstorff, 1989:68; 2004:76).  
What Wolterstorff means, I believe, is that non-Christian thinkers do 
not always reduce the multiplicity of modal aspects to a specific one. 
On this point he is right, but this is a radical form of reductionism. 
There are milder forms in which the recognition of multiple aspects 
is limited to just three or four.10 In practice, it is not easy to quote a 
single philosopher who does recognise all the modal aspects of 
experience and reality. In this sense, reductionism is a rather wide-
                                      
10 Clouser (1996:77-78, footnote 23) distinguishes between “strong reduction” and 
“weak reduction”. He then distinguishes, within the former, the two sub-
categories of “meaning replacement” and “factual identity”. Within the mild 
version of reductionism he distinguishes between “causal dependency” and 
“epiphenomenalism”. Clouser specifies that these first-aid distinctions do not 
include all forms of reductionism, but only those who are blatantly unacceptable 
from a Christian point of view. The reformational analysis of these issues is a 
much more complex and serious attempt than Wolterstorff ’s essay suggests (cf. 
also Clouser, 1996: footnote 10). 
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spread characteristic of Western scholarship (as Wolterstorff recog-
nises, 1989:68; 2004:75).  
However, Dooyeweerd did nowhere maintain that reductionism is al-
ways present in non-Christian philosophy. In this context, Dooye-
weerd does not speak of “non-Christian” philosophy but of “imma-
nence” philosophy. The latter is philosophy which does not recog-
nise an “Archimedean point” outside philosophy itself. Quite ob-
viously, some non-Christian authors do not fit into this category (e.g. 
non-secular Jewish philosophers). The fact that Dooyeweerd does 
not speak of non-Christian, but of “immanence” philosophy is a clue 
to the fact that he may not identify the two.  
There is another factor which should induce to prudence: many of 
the authors who, according to Dooyeweerd, resort to absolutisations 
or reductions are in fact Christians! Descartes, Locke, Kant and 
many more were Christians of some sort. This simply illustrates 
what Dooyeweerd had said already on different occasions: Christian 
and non-Christian scholars are not divided in two well delimited 
groups. In fact, the antithesis challenges the Christian scientific 
community as well (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:524). Scientists who are 
Christians sometimes adhere to unbiblical ground motives when it 
comes to science. Apart from that, they are still under the influence 
of the fall. Non-Christians, on the other hand, can be right on many 
issues, because religious ground motives are not the only source for 
scientific knowledge (Dooyeweerd, 1959:69). There are structural 
“states of affairs” which can be discovered by anyone. Furthermore, 
it should be noticed that according to Dooyeweerd the only radical 
kind of antithesis is the religious one (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:123). 
Theoretical antithesis can only be relative. 
In addition, Dooyeweerd never said that reductionism is the only fea-
ture of immanence philosophy. For example, in a specific passage 
where he (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:45) discusses immanence philo-
sophy, he mentions the problem of absolutisation, not of reduction-
ism. One should therefore start by distinguishing the related yet 
different mechanisms called reductionism, absolutisation, paradox 
and functionalism.11 In this way, one will avoid “reducing to reduc-
                                      
11 For a detailed discussion of these processes (and the difference between them) 
see Hart (1984:86 ff.). Hart defines reductionism as “dealing with an irreducible 
manifold as though it fundamentally were a variety of one kind”; absolutisation 
as “dealing with one aspect of one relational situation as unconditionally 
determining the other aspects”; functionalism as “dealing with entities as reified 
functions” (Hart, 1984:86); and paradox as “dealing with one level of 
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tionism” Dooyeweerd’s elaborated analysis of Western philosophy. 
As a matter of fact, that analysis does not focus on reductionism but 
on the dialectical conflict between the rival poles (nature and free-
dom), constituting the humanist ground motive.  
Contrary to Wolterstorff’s caricaturelike sketch, therefore, reduction-
ism is certainly not the only feature to which reformational philo-
sophers pay attention when interacting with “rival” philosophies, and 
certainly not the only problem they try to avoid in their own theo-
rising. 
3. Religious totalism and the obsession for difference 
3.1 Understanding the allegations 
Wolterstorff (1989:65; 2004:72) accuses the neo-Calvinist of “reli-
gious totalism”. Religion plays too big a role, in his opinion, in the 
neo-Calvinist tradition. In fact, observes Wolterstorff, religion is sup-
posed to create differences everywhere. “Anyone who says, ‘Lo, 
here faith makes a difference, but not there’ can expect from the 
Calvinist an intuitive aversion” (Wolterstorff, 1989:65; 2004:72).  
This obsession for difference, according to Wolterstorff, creates the 
expectation that faithful Christian scholarship must always be “dif-
ferent”. Difference thus becomes a kind of aim of scholarship, while 
at this point Wolterstorff suggests that fidelity is what the Christian 
scholar should try to achieve. 
He does not deny that Christian scholarship, as a whole, will show 
its distinctive character. But one should not expect the differences to 
manifest themselves in each and every “segment” of scholarship 
(Wolterstorff, 1989:70; 2004:78). If a Christian scholar realises that 
he/she agrees with his/her non-Christian colleagues on a specific 
segment of academic work, why worry? The only question one 
should ask is whether one has been faithful to the gospel. There is 
no need to be “constantly querulous” and “suspicious” about the 
agreements emerging among scholars of different persuasion. 
Wolterstorff’s allegation is that if we regard religion as controlling 
scholarship in a rather totalising way, the moment we deal with 
                                                                                                             
functionality in terms of another” (Hart, 1984:129). It should also be realised that 
some forms of reduction play a positive and necessary role in science, and 
cannot be regarded as reductionist strategies. 
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different religious positions we expect differences in the practice of 
scholarship to emerge all along the way. 
3.2 Religious totalism? A reply 
Reformational philosophers regard religion as the ultimate root of 
human being and acting. It must be said, however, that by accepting 
such an all-encompassing role of religion one does not have to view 
all actions, ideas, conceptions and cultural realisations as deter-
mined in a “totalitarian” way by religion. In other words, one has to 
distinguish properly between the religious commitments of a com-
munity (or individual) and their fallible and provisional cultural rea-
lisations in history. If it were not so, one would find no point of con-
tact between people holding to different religious starting points, 
either for communication or cooperation. In addition, the Christian 
could presume, in principle, that his views and theories are always 
right while the non-Christian would be always wrong. Of course this 
is very far from any reformational view. 
I would like to mention a theme in Stafleu’s work, which sheds light 
on this matter. In his philosophy of science Stafleu (1987:26-29) 
avers a “relative independence” of statements and concepts with re-
spect to theories (and a relative independence of theories with re-
spect to “frameworks” like paradigms, religious ground motives or 
worldviews). The idea simply means that theories, concepts and 
statements are not “totally” dependent on the paradigms (or theo-
ries) originating, inspiring or suggesting them.  
Stafleu takes a distance from both positivist and more recent rela-
tivist trends in philosophy of science. Positivists believed that 
frameworks had no influence at all on theories or concepts (but this 
is not the point we want to stress here). On the other hand philo-
sophers like Kuhn and Feyerabend regarded scientific knowledge as 
completely conditioned by the paradigms or frameworks which 
originate it. Stafleu disagrees with both positions: he argues in 
favour of a certain “independence” of scientific elaborations from pa-
radigms and frameworks. This is the reason why, he argues, theo-
ries and concepts can still be compared, and there can be dialogue 
between different schools.12 I will return on this theme in section 
                                      
12 Although I have referred only to Stafleu, to respect the limits of space, I would 
like to clear the eventual suspicion that his position may be unusual within 
reformational circles. Not only is Stafleu’s position nothing “eccentric”, but it is in 
full agreement with (and actually founded on) fundamental tenets of re-
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4.2, to show that commitments are not the only factors that shape 
theories and that reformational philosophy has insisted on the cru-
cial theme of a created structural order. 
Reformational philosophers do certainly argue that scholarship is 
never religiously neutral. This, however, is argued by Wolterstorff as 
well (cf. 1989:68; 2004:76). A “totalitarian” understanding of religion, 
on the contrary, cannot be attributed to the reformational movement. 
3.3 A reply on the “obsession for difference” 
Curiously, Wolterstorff’s discovery of an obsession for difference is 
not supported by references to the writings of any (reformational) 
author. As a matter of fact, I have hardly “met” scholars in this tradi-
tion arguing that difference13 should be among the aims of Christian 
scholarship,14 or that it confirms one’s faithfulness. Here 
Wolterstorff is possibly trying to capture a psychological attitude, 
rather than a conviction. 
At this point, my problem is: how does one proceed to demonstrate 
that the anxiety about differences has not affected an author or a 
movement? Would it be sufficient to quote an author saying “I am 
not worried about differences”, or the like? I doubt it. One would 
probably like to get something more “concrete” than mere declara-
tions. Declarations might even be a subtle way to conceal a pro-
blem. 
Perhaps one should look at the amount of distinctive theories de-
vised by a certain author and on that ground decide whether he was 
obsessed by “difference”. Should this method, however, be applied 
to Wolterstorff himself, would it be sufficient to prove that he had no 
anxiety concerning “difference”? The answer is not so obvious to 
me, as Wolterstorff has devised, for example, a distinctive theory of 
education (Wolterstorff, 1980a), and scholarship (Wolterstorff, 
                                                                                                             
formational philosophy, like the distinction between the pre-theoretical and the 
theoretical levels of thinking (cf. Coletto, 2007:139-140).  
13 In 75 years of reformational philosophising one may of course come across 
occasional statements which may be regarded as supporting Wolterstorff ’s 
point. For example Hart (1988:17) says that Christian scholars should “aim for 
actual, concrete, practical differences and effects within the disciplines”.  
14 On the issue of the aims of science/scholarship, Stafleu (1987:152) and Botha 
(1996:333) help in understanding the reformational approach. 
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1976), and aesthetics (Wolterstorff, 1980b). How would one show, 
therefore, that Wolterstorff has not been obsessed by “difference”?  
Would it be sufficient, perhaps, to show that (notwithstanding the 
distinctive theories he produced) in some “segments” of his scho-
larship Wolterstorff did agree with non-Christian colleagues and has 
peacefully accepted the fact? At least in his ontology he (Wolter-
storff, 1970) has endorsed a certain version of realism, and there-
fore he finds himself agreeing with several non-Christian colleagues. 
Hart (1984:426, footnote 5) still remarks that there remains a 
substantial difference between Wolterstorff’s realism and (e.g.) Arm-
strong’s realism, and that the difference is due to Wolterstorff’s 
theist position. Once again, we deal only with “segments” of agree-
ment. However, would those segments be sufficient to prove that he 
was not obsessed by “difference”?  
If they are not, then Wolterstorff is in the same position as the au-
thors he criticises. If they are sufficient, then one also has to recog-
nise that reformational scholarship too shows several moments of 
agreement with non-Christian scholarship.  
I would mention as random examples Dooyeweerd’s (1984, 1:118) 
recognition that his transcendental critique has clear links with 
Kantian philosophy. In the same way, Dooyeweerd admits that his 
development of the principle of sphere sovereignty would not have 
been possible “without the entire preceding development of modern 
philosophy and of the different branches of modern science” 
(Dooyeweerd 1984, 1:118). Admittedly, he also adds that there are 
differences as well (between the reformational and Kantian views) 
but if segments of agreement are acceptable, then the above exam-
ples are surely valid. Another example is constituted by Hart’s re-
cognition of the merits of both realism and nominalism, aspects of 
which are acknowledged in his own ontology (Hart, 1984:19).  
And if we consider not only the non-Christian, but also those who 
theorise on the basis of a different religious ground motive, then one 
must admit that the search for convergence with Catholic thinkers 
has led the reformational movement not only to appreciation of 
theoretical similarities, but to common action as well. For example, 
the political party founded by Kuyper and the Christian Historical 
Union are nowadays united to a catholic party to form the Christian 
Democratic Appeal. In this process, the contributions of reformation-
al authors like Dengerink (e.g. 1948) and Chaplin (e.g. 1995) have 
played their role. 
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We may have different opinions on and different appreciations of 
Christian democratic politics, but this is not the point. The point is 
that the obsession for difference does not seem to constitute any 
relevant trait of reformational thought and praxis. 
My impression is that on this issue the agreement between Wolter-
storff and his reformational colleagues is broader than what appears 
from his 1989 essay (may one say in this case he has been too 
anxious to detect a difference?).15 For its part, the reformational 
movement has never rejected Wolterstorff’s intuition that difference 
is not the aim of scholarship and that faithfulness is a key concept. 
On the contrary, this suggestion has been normally accepted (cf. 
Van der Walt, 1994:578-579). The reason, I believe, is that it re-
flected a conviction that was already present among reformational 
scholars, even though it had not been formulated as clearly as 
Wolterstorff did.  
It would be simply unfair, in my opinion, to argue that reformational 
thinkers are obsessed about differences. I would rather say that they 
keep their eyes open on the possibility of a different approach in the 
diverse disciplines. After all, if difference is neither the aim of scho-
larship, nor a guarantee of faithfulness, the same must be said 
about agreement or consensus.  
4. Expressivism: science as expression of the self 
4.1 Ignoring the world and the social practice of science 
Another allegation, contained in On Christian learning, is condensed 
in the term expressivism (or expressionism – Wolterstorff, 2004: 
216). Expressivism regards cultural achievements like philosophy, or 
scholarship in general (but also the cultural tradition of a nation, 
community, etc.) as the “expression” of a spirit, religion, worldview 
and so on. It is “what Charles Taylor (...) calls the expressivist vision 
of life. In this vision human activity and life are considered ex-
pressions of the self” (Wolterstorff, 1989:72; 2004:80). 
                                      
15 After all, Wolterstorff has pointed out already in 1976 that there are different 
levels in science and scholarship. There are low-level theories and high-level 
theories (Wolterstorff, 1976:79). Although it is not always immediately apparent, 
the two levels are always linked. Even when we seem to agree on states of 
affairs that are the same for all, we might differ in the interpretation of data, in 
the conclusions we draw and so on. In all this Wolterstorff argues in a pretty 
reformational way. 
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In the specific case of the reformational movement, science or 
scholarship are regarded, according to Wolterstorff, as a mere 
expression of the religion of a particular community. In this way 
science becomes a mere expression of a (communal or individual) 
self who expresses that religion. As a consequence, two other 
fundamental factors for the elaboration of scientific theorising have 
been ignored or heavily underestimated: namely the world and the 
social practice of science (Wolterstorff, 1989:73; 2004:81).  
4.2 Expressing the self while ignoring the world? A reply 
Although Wolterstorff’s analysis of expressivism is commendable, in 
Dooyeweerd’s epistemology science is never simply the expression 
of convictions, not even of religious convictions. According to Wol-
ters (1989:22-23) and Klapwijk (1989:50-52), for example, Dooye-
weerd fought precisely the expressivist view of science. As men-
tioned above, Dooyeweerd did not consider it appropriate, for ex-
ample, to legitimise the mediating role of a worldview between 
Christian philosophy and its religious ground motive (Dooyeweerd, 
1984, 1:114-164). The reason was exactly that this solution would 
come too close to an expressivist position (though he doesn’t use 
the term). This is also the reason, by the way, why he preferred to 
speak of a “Christian” (not of a Calvinist) philosophy (Dooyeweerd 
1984, 1:524). He was not only aware of the problem, but acted in 
order to avoid it. 
According to Wolterstorff, in its expressivist attitude reformational 
philosophy and scholarship have not paid sufficient attention to “the 
world” and to the social practice of science. Limits of space oblige 
me to respond only to the first (and more relevant) allegation, the 
one concerning the world as object of scientific investigation.16 
One might be justified in saying that “the world is not taken into 
account” sufficiently in the philosophy of Feyerabend or some other 
highly subjectivist17 philosopher of science. The statement, how-
ever, does not fit Dooyeweerd’s or reformational philosophy. They 
surely did not ignore “the world”, in their ontology and epistemology. 
                                      
16 Concerning the second allegation (science as a social practice) my impression 
is that Wolterstorff has softened his allegations in the section “Kuyper: science 
as a social practice” (Wolterstorff, 2004:117-118). 
17 The term subjectivist refers to authors who anchor their epistemological views 
especially to the human agent of knowledge (individual or community). It is not, 
therefore, a synonym of “individualist”. 
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To realise it, it is sufficient to take note of the role played in this 
philosophy by the theme of a structural order for creation or reality 
(cf. e.g. Stafleu, 1987:238 ff.; Van Riessen, 1992:54 ff.; Botha, 
1986:85-86; Coletto, 2007). It was exactly the pre-scientific theme of 
creation which provided the reformational school with the idea of 
structures which are not the product of the human subject (or of his 
“religion”).  
According to Dooyeweerd science has to do with “states of affairs” 
that are the same for all scholars, irrespective of their views, con-
victions or theories (Dooyeweerd, 1959:72 ff.). “Once these states of 
affairs have been discovered” says Dooyeweerd, “it would be futile 
to deny them”. Dooyeweerd’s epistemology is anchored to both the 
knower (with his/her point of view) and the structural states of affairs 
which are never totally dependent on specific views. This is why 
such states of affairs are accessible to all scholars, independently of 
their religious orientation. This is why they can be discovered by all 
and there can be interaction and cooperation between scholars of 
different persuasion (Dooyeweerd, 1959:73). 
In this context, Hart’s ontological work represents very well the refor-
mational tradition as it appropriates and elaborates themes from the 
ontology of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. According to Hart 
(1985:155), science constitutes “our understanding of structures, our 
grasp of general patterns, our insight into laws, kinds and pro-
perties”. These laws and structures are irreducible to the human 
subject and are certainly not mere expressions of a “self”. On the 
contrary, they are “nomic conditions” (Hart, 1984:1-83). Reforma-
tional philosophy has typically insisted that when scientific thinking is 
not in tune with the structural realities it tries to account for, all sorts 
of paradoxes, anomalies and incongruences will emerge.  
On this topic too, therefore, the allegations contained in On Christian 
learning are disputable, to say the least. The next section will con-
sider two last allegations. 
5. A one-directional, non-interactive view of religion and 
science 
5.1 Religion influences science, but not vice versa 
According to Wolterstorff, in the neo-Calvinist tradition the expressi-
vist malaise is related to another problem, namely to a “one-direc-
tional, non-interactionist view of the relationship between religion 
and the practice of scholarship” (Wolterstorff, 1989:72; 2004:80). In 
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other words, Wolterstorff argues that the expressivist approach 
(discussed above) leads many neo-Calvinist scholars towards the 
belief that while religion shapes and determines every cultural rea-
lisation, religion itself is never modified or influenced by anything in 
culture. This view is also uni-directional: only the road from religion 
to science is recognised. The “second direction” (from science to 
religion) is simply ignored. 
In a chapter dedicated to “theory and praxis” Wolterstorff (1983:162-
176) says that neo-Calvinism had the merit of questioning one of the 
most fundamental beliefs of the “post-Enlightenment West”: 
That if ever one discerns conflict between one’s religious con-
victions on the one hand, and the results of reputable science 
on the other, then one is obliged, as a rational person to resolve 
the conflict by revising one’s religious convictions. (...) the neo-
Calvinists have had the imagination and courage to ask the 
provocative and deeply unsettling question of whether it is not 
sometimes the right and even the duty of rational individuals to 
restore the harmony by revising their theoretical conclusions. 
(Wolterstorff, 1983:170.) 
Yet Wolterstorff is under the impression that nowadays these scho-
lars have created a new unbalanced view of the relationship 
between science and religion. Speaking about “Kuyper and many of 
his followers”, he says: 
Their picture of the relationship between Christian conviction 
and scientific practice and result is entirely one-directional, from 
faith to science. Kuyper’s emphasis, you will recall, is entirely on 
the way palingenesis influences science. (Wolterstorff, 1989:72; 
2004:80.) 
Therefore, to regain the balance: 
I also insist that in cases of conflict between religion and 
science, people may sometimes alter not their scientific but 
their religious convictions, and that they may do so justifiably; 
sometimes they may even be obliged to do so. (...) At a certain 
point, for instance, it was no longer epistemically permissible for 
Christians to believe they were religiously obliged to hold to the 
geocentric theory. (Wolterstorff, 1989:77-78; 2004:85.) 
Wolterstorff, therefore, does not only argue that neo-Calvinism pro-
motes a non-interactionist view. He also proposes, more positively, 
a few criteria for a good interactionist model. The latter is obtained 
when scientific “convictions” are recognised as factors which may 
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(legitimately) modify or even dismiss “religious” convictions. In the 
next section I am going to reply (as far as the reformational school is 
concerned) to the allegations concerning a “non-interactionist” view 
of religion and science. In the section following that, I will briefly 
discuss Wolterstorff’s own proposals for a proper interactive view. 
5.2 Do reformational thinkers hold a non-interactionist view? 
Did Dooyeweerd really ignore that there is a “second direction”; an 
influence of theorising (and I would add: of experience in general) on 
our most fundamental commitments? It should be noticed that if one 
does not at least take into account the possibility of this influence, 
one would have difficulties even explaining why sometimes some 
people do change their religious commitments. Did Dooyeweerd 
flatly ignore these things? 
For sure he (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 1:565-566) acknowledged the in-
fluence of the special sciences and of philosophy on religion. For 
example, once scientific reflection detects antinomies in its own 
results – one might ask oneself whether the problem does not start 
in the ground motive itself. Philosophy and science, in other words, 
can indicate that an anomaly is taking place, and this fact can then 
put into questioning the ground motive which may be ultimately 
responsible for it.  
From a reformational point of view, however, religion was not the 
only element which was regarded as modifiable by the “second” 
direction (i.e. by scientific theorising). The discussion, in reforma-
tional circles, about the impact of scientific knowledge on worldviews 
started quite early (Kalsbeek, 1975:170-171). The idea that world-
views are influenced, not only by religion, but also by daily ex-
perience (including scientific knowledge) has been one of the most 
popular within reformational circles. These are just a few notes, but 
they surely point towards an awareness of the influence of science 
on religion. 
It can therefore be excluded that reformational philosophy promotes 
a non-interactionist view of the relationship between religion and 
science. It might be argued, rather, that it does not endorse Wol-
terstorff’s solution completely, especially when it comes to the issue 
of the alteration or elimination of religious beliefs. On this point the 
crucial question is whether Christians are entitled to formulate the 
hypothesis that they could legitimately “give up” their religion. 
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5.3 Wolterstorff’s interactive  view of science and religion 
Before answering the previous question, one should make sure 
about Wolterstorff’s intentions. What does he mean when he says 
that (Christian) “religious” beliefs can be altered or even eliminated 
by science? In some instances he gives the example of the geo-
centric theory, defended by the church but challenged by scientists 
like Galileo. In other instances, however, what may be changed or 
even “given up” is one’s “Christian commitment” (Wolterstorff, 1976: 
89), one’s “religious convictions” (Wolterstorff, 1989:77; 2004:85) or 
beliefs.  
The question is what exactly can be altered or even refuted by 
science, according to Wolterstorff? Is it only beliefs which are peri-
pheral (yet perhaps wrongly regarded as essential in a certain epoch 
by a certain Christian community), or is it our very faith, commit-
ment, the Christian religion itself? If Wolterstorff means the former 
(i.e. peripheral beliefs) he is not saying much. This is what has 
happened for the last 2 000 years and no objection would be raised 
from a reformational point of view. If he means the latter (i.e. religion 
itself), however, in my opinion he is saying too much. 
As “official” commentator18 of Wolterstorff’s philosophy, Sloane 
(2003:223-232) avers that Wolterstorff defends the possibility of 
loosing one’s Christian religion. Sloane explains Wolterstorff’s views 
by using a “medical metaphor” (Sloane, 2003:224 ff.). An organism 
(i.e. a religious commitment) can die when one of its most important 
organs are affected. Even a disease affecting marginal organs can 
lead to the death of an organism when it spreads to or affects vital 
organs. 
On the basis of this clarification, what would it mean that the refor-
mational movement holds a non-interactionist view? It means that 
reformational thinkers have not been as prepared as Wolterstorff to 
admit that one’s Christian commitment (i.e. religion) can be lost. On 
this point, however, one should also admit that there are theological 
and confessional objections to the idea that the Christian religion 
can be “lost”. In fact, the latter is definitely in contrast with the 
doctrine of the “final perseverance of the saints”. For reformed theo-
logy, there is not such a thing as “dis-conversion”. If this may be 
called a control-belief, I am afraid it does not play the role it should 
                                      
18 Sloane’s commentary on Wolterstorff ’s philosophy has been “approved” by 
Wolterstorff himself in the foreword to the book (Sloane, 2003:xiii-xiv). 
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in Wolterstorff’s view of the relationship between science and reli-
gion. 
Here we may have reached a crucial characteristic of Wolterstorff’s 
philosophy. As Hart has noticed long ago (Hart, 1979:190 ff.), in this 
tradition the power of rationality seems to border on autonomy. This, 
however, is material for another discussion. As it is not my purpose 
to criticise Wolterstorff’s philosophy, it is advisable to conclude my 
“apology” here. 
6. Conclusion 
There are many aspects of Wolterstorff’s contributions which can be 
and are appreciated from a reformational point of view. As a matter 
of fact, many of Wolterstorff’s suggestions have been welcomed by 
various reformational thinkers, e.g. Wolterstorff’s critique of founda-
tionalism. In this regard Venter (1994:262) admits that Wolterstorff’s 
critique may concern some of the “fathers” of the neo-Calvinist 
movement. In particular Kuyper might have been exposed to the 
temptation of regarding the Bible as a deposit of logical truths from 
which true propositions might be derived and applied to science. 
Van der Walt (1994:44-45; 578-579) too appropriates several in-
sights from Wolterstorff’s philosophy. More recently Botha (2006:28-
30) shows appreciation for Wolterstorff’s notion of control beliefs (cf. 
also Duvenage, 1985:35). 
On the other hand, this article has tried to show that some of Wolter-
storff’s allegations are not fairly applicable to the reformational 
tradition. I hope it will help overcoming eventual obstacles and pre-
judices, in view of renewed dialogue and interaction. 
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